




INNOVATION CONSIDERATIONS IN MERGER CONTROL AND 
UNILATERAL CONDUCT ENFORCEMENT 
 




Non price considerations in merger control and unilateral conduct enforcement have been 
elements of the competition authorities’ assessment in the last few decades. Recently a 
revamped emphasis on such factors and in particular on the importance of innovation has 
characterised the European Commission’s enforcement practice. The paper looks into 
merger control cases as well as two unilateral conduct cases (Microsoft and Google 
Shopping) and discusses the approach the European Commission has taken on the impact 
of concentrations as well as of abusive conducts on innovation. The paper argues that the 
approach the European Commission takes in assessing innovation in merger control is 
pragmatic and appropriate for dynamic competition that characterises innovative markets. 
In relation to the assessment of the harm on innovation in unilateral conduct cases, the 
paper emphasizes the need for a balanced approach that prevents an adverse impact on 
innovation incentives of the dominant company while at the same time maintains a robust 
approach to competition harm induced by abusive conducts. 
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Recent trends in the European Commission’s (‘Commission’) approach to merger control 
and unilateral conduct enforcement relates to concerns about non-price competition factors 
such as quality and innovation. Innovation has always been considered as one of the main 
parameters of competition, along-side price, quantity, quality and choice, but has recently 
attracted a lot of attention by enforcers and academics as a result of some recent decisions.1  
 
An interesting observation of markets driven by innovation is that neither price nor quantity 
plays any decisive role since the services may not be monetized on the consumer side (there 
is no price expressed in terms of monetary terms) and the marginal costs can be negligible. 
The only parameters that can be used as yardsticks to determine the effects on fair 
competition in such markets are quality, innovation and choice. The Commission’s stance 
in the Google case2 is one of the best examples that focuses precisely on these non-price 
parameters where the Commission observed that Google shopping results denied European 






                                                 
1 See judgements C-413/06 P Bertelsmann; T-168/01 Glaxo; and C-413/14 Intel. 
2 See Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping). 






New technologies that displace existing markets are commonly referred to as ‘dynamic 
competition’ and are contrasted with ‘competition in the market’ or ‘static competition’ 
where competition takes place on the basis of price and output.4 Firms must sustain and 
enhance their innovation potential as a means of achieving dominance or to fend off 
challengers. As Gifford and Kurdle note, new challengers to existing technologies 
frequently enter the market, and unsuccessful challengers exit.5 Katz and Shapiro6 argue 
that in markets where innovation plays a role, the tendency for the market to exhibit rapid 
innovation means that new products will emerge which can and do upset and even replace 
the status quo. This tendency is the oil to the fire of innovation that drives such markets. 
 
Arguments have been raised that the positive correlation between innovation and 
technological markets, such as the online search market, would warrant exceptions in terms 
of competition law, as the market naturally tends through innovation to market power and 
competition works on the basis of competition for the market.7 Larouche argues that 
competition for the market which usually goes in tandem with a dominant position, 
                                                 
4 Graef, I., Wahyuningtyas, S. Y., Valcke, (2014), How Google and others upset competition analysis 
disruptive innovation and European competition law, 25th European Regional Conference of the International 
Telecommunications Society (ITS), Brussels, Belgium, 22-25 June 2014, http//hdl.handle.net/10419/101378.  
5 Gifford D, Kurdle R., Antitrust approaches to dynamically competitive industries in the united states and 
the European Union, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 7(3), 695–731.  
6 Katz M., and Shapiro C., Systems Competition and Network Effects (1994) 8(2) Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 93. 
7 Indicatively Diez F., Google, in the Aftermath of Microsoft and Intel The Right Approach to Antitrust 
Enforcement in Innovative High Tech Platform Markets? (June 12, 2012 Centro Universitario Villanueva), 
Geiger A., Thou shalt not dominate, Manne G., and Wright J., Innovation and the limits of Antitrust (2010) 6 






provides stronger incentives for breakthrough innovation, since the whole market is the 
prize of the innovation efforts.8 
 
Economists around the world have tried to analyze the correlation between innovation and 
competition very extensively throughout the years. Schumpeter9 claimed that innovation 
increases when the market is less competitive. He argues that decreased competition in a 
market leads to more innovation.10 As a consequence of low competition, companies could 
focus more on post-innovation and R&D processes rather than price and output competition 
in the market. In addition, if price competition arose in the market, the market leader would 
probably be forced to invest in innovation in order to secure its place instead of encouraging 
companies to take the role of the leading rivals in the market. By contrast, Arrow11 believed 
that in fact this pressure in the market leads to innovation growth since companies in the 
competitive market would intend to generate better or more cost-efficient products in order 
to draw away potential challengers. Thus, an innovating company would be able to attract 
                                                 
8 Larouche P., The European Microsoft Case at the Crossroads of Competition Policy And Innovation, TILEC 
Discussion Paper No 2008-021 
9 Joseph Schumpeter, Socialism, capitalism and democracy, Harper and Brothers (5th edn, George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd, 1976) 
10 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism And Democracy (1st edn, 1942) 
http://cnqzu.com/library/Economics/marxian%20economics/Schumpeter,%20Joeseph-
Capitalism,%20Socialism%20and%20Democracy.pdf  
11 Kenneth Arrow, ‘Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention’ in The Rate and 






sales from its rivals. Arrow argues that an increase in competition in the market leads to 
more innovation.12 
 
The issue however is not with respect to the debate whether innovation is directly or 
inversely proportional to competition in the market. The real challenge, while analyzing 
the nexus between innovation and competition, is to find a reasonable answer to the 
question whether the existing competition law frameworks and regulators around the world 
have sufficient means and tools to determine the effects of competition on innovation and 
vice-versa. The ever-changing technologies and digitalization of markets may have induced 
progress and advancement at various levels of the economy. But at the same time, their 
overreaching impact on the economy and on consumer welfare in the long run is yet 
ambiguous. In such dynamic times, it is very important for us to determine whether 
sophisticated regulators like the Commission is well-equipped to deal with the complicated 
non-price issues like innovation in competition enforcement.  
 
The aim of this paper is to discuss how the Commission has approached the issues related 
to innovation in merger control and unilateral conduct cases and what challenges it faced 
while determining the applicability of  competition law to markets characterized by 
innovation. The paper is going to discuss the two seminal unilateral conduct cases, 
Microsoft and Google, along-with various merger control decisions to analyze the 
Commission’s approach in handling the complexities related to the assessment of 
competition in innovation driven markets.  
                                                 







The Commission’s approach to innovation in unilateral conduct cases seems to be less 
developed due to the fewer number of cases compared to merger control. Two unilateral 
conduct cases where the potential harm on innovation played a role and this paper will 
discuss and contrast is Microsoft13 and Google Shopping14 (hereinafter “Google”). We will 
focus only on these two cases as Microsoft is the first case in the high-tech software sector 
where the Commissions refers to innovation as part of its unilateral conduct assessment, 
and Google is the most recent example with Google Android15 for which though there is 
still no published decision.16 Thus, we will how the approach to the assessment of 
innovation has evolved. Other unilateral conduct cases where the impact of the conduct on 
innovation was relevant albeit to a varying degree include Intel,17 Tomra18 and 
Qualcomm.19  
                                                 
13 37792 MICROSOFT 
14 39740 Google Search (Shopping) 
15 40099 Google Android 
16 At the time of writing. 
17 See section V.5 of the decision. Indicatively, (139) Innovation is, together with price, one of the main 
factors that triggers demand in the x86 industry. The very high research and development (R&D) and 
production costs can usually only be recovered if new inventions can be sold before the competitor responds 
with a more innovative product. (140)  The pace of innovation is rapid. Rapid innovation means quick 
increases in CPU transistor density and quick improvements in the CPU architecture.  
18 Innovation is only mentioned in paragraph 100 of the Commission’s decision. Although Tomra’s internal 
documents also mention normal means of competition, such as product innovation, an expansion of its 
product portfolio and customer satisfaction as barriers for competitors192, long-term preferred supplier 
contracts or high volume block orders with all major customers are often referred to as key elements in 
Tomra’s policy of preventing market entries or denying market access to competitors. [confidential] 
19 In Qualcomm (Qualcomm/Icera, predation, Case 39711) the Commission does not refer to the impact on 






While, the remedies in the merger decisions we will analyse, have sought to ensure that 
innovation is not harmed as a result of the merger, the size of the fines in the unilateral 
conduct cases as compared to the dominant undertakings’ budget devoted to R&D has the 
potential to mitigate the innovation drive of these undertakings. Merger control is based on 
an ex ante assessment of potential harm arising from a concentration, thus any imposed 
remedies aim at preventing this harm from arising. Unilateral conduct enforcement is an ex 
post assessment of harm induced by the intentional abuse by a dominant company of its 
market power, thus fines in such cases have a deterrence as well as punitive element. 
 
Section I will discuss how innovation became a very important non-price factor in 
competition assessment. Section II will then discuss briefly the main economic theories 
behind the relevance of innovation for competition enforcement and will analyse the role 
of innovation in merger control and unilateral conduct cases. Section III will assess the 










                                                 







I. Innovation as a non-price competition factor 
 
The most usual form of consumer harm arising in competition enforcement relates to an 
increase in the price of the relevant products/services. In addition to price, competition 
harm as a result of a merger can arise in relation to non-price parameters such as the quantity 
sold, service quality, product range,20 product quality,21 geographical location, productive 
capacity and innovation.22 The ability of firms to adjust these elements, and also the time 
within which they can do so, will depend upon the market concerned.23 
 
The technological evolution and revolution24 over the last few decades have demanded a 
revised approach in regulating competition in such markets whereby intervention by 
competition regulators would no longer revolve primarily around the creation or the 
strengthening of market power, but around the likely effects of a conduct or transaction on 
innovation.25 This would require alteration in the yardsticks and factors that the 
Commission has conventionally adapted for competition law analysis. It needs to be 
                                                 
20 See, for example, Proposed acquisition of Ottakar’s plc by HMV Group plc through Waterstone’s 
Booksellers Ltd, CC, May 2006, and Anticipated acquisition by Boots Group plc of Alliance UniChem plc, 
OFT decision ME/2134/05, May 2006. 
21 Proposed acquisition of Ottakar’s plc by HMV Group plc through Waterstone’s Booksellers Ltd, May 
2006. 
22 Carl Zeiss Jena GmbH and Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc: a report on the proposed acquisition of the 
microscope business of Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc, CC, May 2004. 
23 UK Merger Assessment Guidelines, CC2 (Revised) / OFT1254 
24 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (WEF 2016). 







ascertained that while price is certainly an important factor for many consumers, a simple 
focus on price from the perspective of a competition regulator, poses a number of problems. 
Consumers may face a non-price-related detriment such as access, poor quality, lack of 
information, reduced choice, or less innovation. Price may not be the primary factor in 
determining demand side decisions in all types of markets and price may not be the main 
means of competition between the incumbents in a market. Thus, alternative means of 
competition can range from entirely non-economic ones to those that retain focus on 
economic objectives without however focusing exclusively on the price criterion.  
 
Thus, even though price has traditionally been the main parameter for competition, in the 
light of the ever-changing economies and fast-growing dynamic sectors, this trend has been 
diluted. The evolution of digitalization and online business environment has imposed 
challenges to competition regulators around the world as they find it difficult to cultivate 
apt tools for assessment in markets where competition is taking place on the basis of the 
level and type of innovation.26  
 
Competition regulators around the world agree that economics of dynamic markets work 
very differently in comparison to static markets. In a static competition setting, firms are 
under pressure to operate at lowest cost (productive efficiency) and to best utilize the 
limited resources (allocative efficiency), with the most efficient products being reflected in 
the lowest price (static efficiency). Dynamic competition on the other hand, starts from a 
different assumption. Here, firms compete to create products with the highest quality, 
                                                 
26 Graef, Inge; Wahyuningtyas, Sih Yuliana; Valcke, Peggy: Conference Paper How Google and others upset 
competition analysis: disruptive innovation and European competition law 25th European Regional 






which tends to result in the introduction of new products leading to dynamic efficiency. 
Whilst price is the distinctive indicator in static efficiency, dynamic efficiency can be 
indicated by different proxies in which innovation plays a prominent role, such as product 
innovation reflected in the introduction of new products and services; process innovation 
indicated by improvement of production technologies; an increase in choices for 
consumers, and an increase in the quality of products.27 Therefore, assessing antitrust issues 
in such markets may become complicated and requires more sophisticated frameworks to 
rectify competition law concerns.  
 
Several legislative provisions around the world address innovation and other non-price 
parameters in assessing antitrust issues.28 The Commission acknowledges in its guidelines 
on the assessment of horizontal and non-horizontal mergers (‘EU Guidelines’),29 the non-
price dimensions of effective competition such as high quality, a wide choice of goods and 
services, and innovation, and takes the stance that its mission is to prevent mergers that 
                                                 
27 Ibid. 
28 The UK merger guidelines 
(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/284449/
OFT1254.pdf) have incorporated price and non-price parameters of a firm’s competitive offer to its 
customers, that can be worsened as a result of an anticompetitive merger. In 2010 the US FTC and US DOJ 
issued their revised Horizontal Merger Guidelines (‘US Guidelines’). These updated US Guidelines 
incorporate non-price considerations in merger analysis. 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf 
29 Commission (EU) Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3, para. 8 and Commission (EU) Guidelines 
on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 






would  deprive customers of these benefits by significantly increasing the market power of 
firms. An increase in market power in that regard refers to ‘the ability of one or more 
undertakings to profitably increase prices, reduce output, choice or quality of goods and 
services or diminish innovation’ [emphasis added].30 It has convincingly been argued that 
these dimensions of competition are ‘of particular importance in the Internet, broadcast 
television, and radio industries, where the competition extends beyond advertising 
prices’.31 In that respect, considering the inclusion in a merger analysis of markets in which 
the quality rather than the price of the products offered is relevant and examining the impact 
of a concentration on non-price competition are legitimate issues of consideration in merger 
control enforcement. 
 
Averitt and Lande32 illustrate the importance of non-price factors in competition assessment 
by giving the example of a merger in the book publishing sector. They note that, while such 
a concentration may not necessarily result in higher prices, it is likely to lead to a decrease 
in editorial diversity and ‘thus, to a narrowing of the competing marketplace options 
expressed in terms of the types of titles offered’ which can be challenged under the 
‘ordinary, universal standards of Section 7,33 once that Section has been properly construed 
                                                 
30 Commission (EU) Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the 
control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] OJ C 31/3, para. 8 and Commission (EU) Guidelines 
on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations 
between undertakings [2008] OJ C 265/7, para. 10 
31 Stucke M., Grunes A., Big Data and Competition Policy, OUP, 279 
32 Averitt, N./Lande, R., “Using the ‘Consumer Choice’ Approach to Antitrust Law, 74 Antitrust L.J. (2007), 
pp. 175-264 






to recognize the role of options and of non-price competition.’34 Stucke and Grunes take 
the same position in discussing how US antitrust law can be modified so that it can include 
in the relevant analyses the marketplace of ideas.35 These arguments, which suggest a 
change in approach and thus a different interpretation of the relevant legislative instruments 
in order to assess the impact of a concentration on editorial competition, are equally valid 
for the Commission’s relevant decision-making. In HMV/Ottakar’s,36 the UK Competition 
Commission argued that competition in book retailing at the local level between existing 
stores is concentrated on two non-price factors, range of titles in stock and quality of in-
store service. It added that non-price competition encompasses principally competition on 
range and service.  
 
The adoption of non-price factors of competition as an essential factor in assessing 
consumer harm has also been incorporated in the debate regarding the aims of competition 
law. To refer to such an example proponents of a ‘consumer choice’ standard37 argue that 
it would better accommodate aspects such as short-term variety, non-price competition and 
long-term innovation that seem to pose difficulties when assessed by means of the 
consumer welfare standard. Proponents have referred to particular cases in which the 
‘consumer choice’ criterion would seem to be crucial, such as Microsoft,38 where in its 
                                                 
34 Ibid. 
35 Stucke M., Grunes A., Big Data and Competition Policy, OUP, 298 
36 https://www.gov.uk/cma-cases/hmv-group-plc-ottakar-s-plc-merger-inquiry-cc  
37 Averitt, N./Lande, R./Nihoul, P., “’Consumer choice’ is where we are all going – so let’s go together”, 
Foreword, Concurrences No 2-2011; Averitt, N./Lande, R., “Using the ‘Consumer Choice’ Approach to 







media player tying decision, the  Commission focused on the anticompetitive effect 
stemming from preventing customers to base their choices on their non-price preferences, 
hence considering the factors whose consideration would be rendered easier if a consumer 
choice paradigm were explicitly introduced in competition enforcement. A similar 
argument is relevant for the Google case where the abusive conduct is connected with an 
improvement in the quality of a service provided by Google. Similar traits are detected in 
various EU39 and US cases.40 Because the consumer welfare standard encompasses both 
price and non-price elements, the two standards do not diverge when there is a deterioration 
of the quality of the post-merger product, even if there is no price increase,41 unless the 
consumer welfare standard is construed narrowly and focuses on price factors.  
 
The growing importance of considering non-price factors like innovation is not recent. 
There is dearth of caselaw based on network effects, the lock-in effect, the gatekeeper 
effect, switching costs, and multi-sided markets. But now such analysis requires to factor 
in a significant increase in the pace of innovation with continuous developments such as 
open-source software, online ecosystems, scale effects, feedback loops, data, and 
algorithms. Therefore, competition authorities around the world need to be cognizant of 
these new trends in order to protect the standards of consumer welfare in a more effective 
way. 
 
                                                 
39 France Telecom (C-202/07 P [2009]; T-340/03 [2007]); Wanadoo (COMP/38.223); cf. in detail Nihoul, P., 
“’Freedom of choice’: The Emergence of a powerful Concept in European Competition Law, 05.06.2012, 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2077694  







II. Innovation in competition enforcement  
 
Several debates over time have claimed that the US approach towards giving innovation a 
more prominent place in competition analysis is more proactive than the Commission’s 
take on the matter.42 While holding leadership positions at the Antitrust Division of the 
United States Department of Justice (DoJ), Gilbert and Sunshine initiated a debate about 
the role of innovation in merger analysis as early as the 1990s.43 They introduced the 
concept of ‘innovation markets’ which would enable competition authorities to measure 
the impact of a merger in downstream product markets as well as in upstream innovation 
markets. In their view, the latter approach is necessary to assess the effects of a proposed 
transaction on innovation in markets where the merging parties are not actual or even 
potential competitors prior to the merger.44 Such analysis ensures that the competition 





                                                 
42 DAF/COMP(2017)2 “Competition Issues in Aftermarkets”, available at 
https://one.oecd.org/document/DAF/COMP(2017)2/en/pdf. 
43 Both Richard J. Gilbert and Steven C. Sunshine were formerly Deputy Assistant Attorneys General in the 
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice.  
44 Gilbert RJ and Sunshine SC, "Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use 






Innovation has been argued to play a fundamental role in the Commission’s goal of 
increasing growth and investments.45 Economic literature has identified two main forms of 
innovation, product and process innovation.46 Product innovation relates to when specific 
goods or services are introduced in the market for the first time or are significantly 
improved from the ones pre-existing in the market; with respect to their characteristics or 
intended uses. Process innovation relates to the implementation of a new or significantly 
improved production or delivery method.47  
 
Although there are many schools of thought on the relationship between innovation and 
degree of concentration in a market, the two most prominent in recent debate are Aghion’s48 
and Shapiro’s49. Aghion describes the relationship between competition and innovation (as 
proxied by the Lerner index and patent activity) as an inverted U shape i.e. for low levels 
of competition, innovation initially increases as competition becomes more intense; and 
after reaching its peak, innovation declines as competition intensifies further.  
 
 
                                                 
45 'PRIORITY Jobs, Growth And Investment Stimulating Investment For The Purpose Of Job Creation' 
(European Commission, 2017) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/jobs-growth-and-investment_en  
46 Competition Policy Brief EU Merger Control And Innovation (1st edn, European Commission 2016) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf>  
47 Competition Directorate–General of the European Commission, ‘Competition policy brief’ (2016)  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpb/2016/2016_001_en.pdf 
48 Aghion et al., Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U Relationship, NBER Working Paper No. 9269, 
Issued in October 2002 
49 Shapiro C., ‘Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull’s Eye?’ in J Lerner and S Stern (eds) The 






The result is that the rate of innovation increases more rapidly than in unlevelled industries 
and that innovation rates are generally higher for all levels of concentration and competition 
in markets. The increase in innovative activity will be temporary, until the industry reaches 
its new steady state. This is predicted to occur when the industry becomes unlevelled (i.e. 
a single firm has much larger technological capacity than all others).  
 
Shapiro’s theory on innovation is based on three main principles. First, markets must be 
contestable for innovation to flourish. Second, increased appropriability (ability for a firm 
to capture value from its innovation and ability to protect the competitive advantage 
associated with it) increases innovation. Third, synergies arising from complementary 
R&D assets enhances the ability to innovate. Both Aghion and Shapiro’s approaches 
represent a movement away from a narrow, pipeline-to-product-market approach in merger 
enforcement. These newer theories are concerned with whether the merger could affect 
innovation in the industry as a whole, rather than that which is specifically related to the 
merging parties, and questions the validity of a presumption that mergers reduce 
innovation. 
 
The Commission has taken onboard the above theories of innovation in its merger 












II.1 Commission’s approach to innovation in merger control 
 
Innovation is a factor explicitly mentioned in the European Commission Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines,50 as well as the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines.51 The concept of 
innovation is difficult to quantify and hence factoring it as a non-price factor in merger 
assessment becomes tougher for competition regulators.52 Proxies that have been used 
include number of patents, number of new products and R&D spending. However, the 
correlation is not necessarily significant as the final products arising from any of these 
proxies may underestimate the investment on innovation.  
 
In recent years, there seems to be an attempt of explicitly incorporating innovation in 
merger assessment. There is an ever increasing body of caselaw related to the assessment 
of the impact of a concentration on innovation. The approach the Commission took in the 
earlier cases such as the ones in the pharmaceutical sector that we will analyse below, 
                                                 
50 In markets where innovation is an important competitive force, a merger may increase the firms' ability 
and incentive to bring new innovations to the market and, thereby, the competitive pressure on rivals to 
innovate in that market. Alternatively, effective competition may be significantly impeded by a merger 
between two important innovators, for instance between two companies with "pipeline" products related to a 
specific product market. Similarly, a firm with a relatively small market share may nevertheless be an 
important competitive force if it has promising pipeline products. Guidelines on the assessment of non-
horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
[2008] OJ 1 265/6, paragraph 38. 
51 The Commission will assess innovation noting that vertical and conglomerate mergers are more likely to 
create efficiencies than mergers between competitors in the same market. 
52 Ioannis Kokkoris, Howard Shelanski, EU Merger Control: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1st edn, 






illustrates a cautious and gradual attempt to explicitly incorporate innovation concerns as a 
factor in the assessment. As the experience of the Commission evolved, its approach 
changed and in more recent cases such as the Dow/Dupont and the Bayer/Monsanto the 
Commission became bolder. In the earlier cases, the focus of the analysis of innovation was 
mainly limited to overlap products as well as overlap R&D pipelines that were closer to 
commercialisation than is the case in the more recent decisions. Furthermore, in the more 
recent cases, the Commission expanded from antitrust markets to antitrust innovation 
spaces, that may involve a group of antitrust product markets that are characterised by 
similar innovation efforts. Thus, the remedies in the latter cases appear to be more 
expansive than the ones in the former cases. 
 
In a number of earlier cases in the pharmaceutical sector the Commission was concerned if 
the merger make the post-merger entity the sole owner of important assets for the 
innovation in the sector.53 In Glaxo Wellcome/ Smithkline Beecham54 the Commission 
argued that the merger may deter any R&D trial by other parties to improve anti-viral 
medications. The EU Commission concluded that the merger can be cleared as there were 
similar products in the anti-migraine market being developed by other competitors. The 
Commission’s practice has shown that it will assess innovation and the impact of the 
merger on innovation even if the R&D is still in its early stages. In Pfizer/Hospira55, and 
                                                 
53 Vodafone Airtouch/Mannesmann (Case COMP/M.1795) Commission decision [2003] OJ C 300 
54 Case No COMP/M.1846 - Glaxo Wellcome / Smithkline Beecham 
55 Case No COMP/M7559  PFIZER/ HOSPIRA [2015] EC. The Commission was concerned about future 
innovations for biosimilar drugs, which are equivalent with the biological pharmaceuticals. The Commission 
argued that Pfizer would have either delayed or even stopped the development of Samsung Bioepis and only 






Medtronic/Covidien56 the Commission cleared both transactions with divestments as one 
of the merging companies was in the process of selling a drug, while the other company 
was in the late-stage of developing potential competing product, and the merger would risk 
the elimination of the product in development.57 In a recent case, 
Novartis/GlaxoSmithKine’s (GSK) oncology business58, the Commission assessed all 
research in development and not just the ones in the later stages of development and thus 
more likely to be successful. The Commission further raised concerns that GSK has similar 
pipeline projects with Novartis.  
 
These cases illustrate an interesting path of the Commission’s journey to its current 
approach in the assessment of innovation in concentrations. Interestingly, in a survey on 65 
cleared transactions conducted by Haucap and Stiebale, they argued that mergers in the 
pharmaceutical sectors impede innovation not only between the merged firms but on the 
non-merging parties.59 In the earlier cases (Glaxo Wellcome/ Smithkline Beecham,60 
                                                 
56 Case No COMP/M7326 MEDTRONIC/ COVIDIEN [2014]. In the Medtronic/Covidien case, Medtronic 
was the market leader in the drug-coated balloons market. Covidien had a drug-coated balloon named 
Stellarex, which was a last stage pipeline product. The Commission argued that innovation in relation to 
Stellarex would have been prevented. 
57 The divestment related to the product in development 
58 Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline’s Oncology Business (Case No COMP/M.7275) [2015]. 
59 Justus Haucap, Joel Stiebale, ‘Research: Innovation Suffers When Drug Companies Merge’, Harvard 
Business Review, 3 August 2016 https://hbr.org/2016/08/research-innovation-suffers-when-drug-companies-
merge. 






Pfizer/Hospira61, and Medtronic/Covidien) the Commission seems to adopt a more limited 
approach to the assessment of R&D pipelines and of innovation efforts. In 
Novartis/GlaxoSmithKine’s (GSK) oncology business62 the Commission adopted an 
expanded perspective and a different analysis of the overlap of the merging parties and 
went beyond the R&D efforts/overlaps of the parties in the later stages of development, 
analysing all R&D efforts of the merging parties.  
 
The Commission’s evolving analytical approach to innovation in the pharmaceutical sector 
became relevant for concentrations in other sectors as well. In Intel/Mc Afee63, the 
Commission was concerned about the fact that the innovation could be affected negatively 
by the foreclosure, which would have been created by Intel, by complying its central 
processing units and chipsets solely with McAfee’s software service and thus curtailing 
endpoint security solutions for rivals of McAfee. The merger was cleared after behavioural 
remedies committing Intel to procure services from competitors of McAfee. The approach 
the Commission took regarding the impact on innovation resembles its assessment in earlier 
vertical cases with the important difference that the focus was on the impact of potential 
foreclosure on innovation.  
 
                                                 
61 Case No COMP/M7559  PFIZER/ HOSPIRA [2015] EC. The Commission was concerned about future 
innovations for biosimilar drugs, which are equivalent with the biological pharmaceuticals. The Commission 
argued that Pfizer would have either delayed or even stopped the development of Samsung Bioepis and only 
consider Hospira’s existing inflimax (co-marketed with Celltrion), or would have left  inflimax to Celltrion.  
62 Novartis/GlaxoSmithKline’s Oncology Business (Case No COMP/M.7275) [2015]. 






The Commission in the prohibition decision Deutsche Borse/NYSE,64 argued that the 
concentration would lessen the incentive which the merged entity would have to innovate, 
inter alia, in technology competition and would give rise to a reduction in the innovation 
available for customers. In the appeal to the General Court, Deutsche Borse claimed that 
the Commission’s finding that the operation would reduce innovation was ‘manifestly 
incorrect and unsubstantiated’ but the General Court rejected those claims.65 It added that 
the fact, that all major derivatives exchanges are operators and developers of trading 
technology does not call into question the conclusion that the merger would lessen the 
innovation incentives of the merged entity and would result overall in less innovation being 
available to customers in those markets.66 The Commission’s argument follows a standard 
unilateral effects analysis with innovation as the main theory of harm rather than an adverse 
impact on price related factors. 
 
In a controversial case, GE/Alstom67 the Commission was concerned about reduced 
innovation and higher prices in the market for a technology vital to responding to climate 
change. The Commission argued that the merger would bring together two of the three 
main competitors in the market. This would eliminate a significant innovator, diminish 
                                                 
64 Deutsche Borse/NYSE Euronext (Case COMP/M.6166) Commission decision [2012] OJ C 440  
65 Case T-175/12 Deutsche Borse AG v European Commission [2015] EU:T:2015:148 para 171 and paras 
160-177.  the fact, referred to by the applicant, that all major derivatives exchanges around the world are 
operators and developers of trading technology is not such as to call into question the conclusion that the 
concentration would lessen the incentive which the merged entity would have to innovate in technology, 
process and market design in order to respond to those same competitive threats, and would result overall in 
less innovation being available to customers in those markets. 
66 Case T-175/12 Deutsche Borse AG v European Commission [2015] EU:T:2015:148 para 177. 






competitive pressure on other rivals and reduce rival’s incentive to invest in innovation. 
Alstom had to divest parts of the heavy-duty gas turbines business to Ansaldo as a remedy.68 
Similar to the cases above, the Commission assessed the impact on innovation on particular 
antitrust markets and required remedies that would prevent this adverse impact on 
innovation.  
 
The Commission’s approach in the Dow/Dupont69 transaction followed the 
Novartis/GlaxoSmithKine’s (GSK) oncology business70 in that it did not assess the 
innovation efforts of the parties that were close to commercialisation as in the earlier cases 
but also the parties’ innovation activities that were at a much earlier stage, that of research 
than that of the development. In addition, the Commission in this case moved from the 
concept of antitrust markets to that of innovation spaces. This is the first case where we see 
this new approach of the Commission that also led to extensive remedies in relation to 
innovation.  
 
                                                 
68 The parties had to divest products that were likely to be discontinued, as well as existing upgrades, and 
pipeline technology for a future upgrade of the relevant product. Alstom committed to release a significant 
share of its long-term servicing agreement for the GT26 turbine, divest its test facilities for its turbines and 
its R&D engineers, in order to enhance the viability of the purchaser. 
69 Case M. 7932 Dow/Dupont dated 27.3.2017.  






In Dow/Dupont,71 Commissioner Vestager argued that: ‘We need to make sure that the 
proposed merger does not lead to higher prices or less innovation for these products.’72 In 
this case, the Commission investigated whether there would be lack of incentives to 
continue ongoing parallel innovation. Looking at the R&D pipelines of the parties, the 
Commission found that the two are competing head-to-head in a number of important 
herbicide, insecticide and fungicide innovation spaces. After the merger, they would have 
an incentive to discontinue some of these costly development efforts to avoid duplication. 
The Commission in Dow/DuPont found specific evidence pointing toward lower incentives 
and lower ability to innovate post-merger. According to these findings, the merged entity 
would certainly cut back on R&D spending which would be a factor against approval of 
the concentration. 
 
The merger was conditionally cleared with a significant divestment on part of DuPont’s 
existing pesticide business including its research and development organisations and its 
pipeline projects, along-with  both tangible and intangible assets. Such divestment was 
sought by the Commission in order to enable the purchaser to become a global integrated 
research and development competitor.73 The merger was approved after significant 
divestments that  focused on maintaining the innovation in the market.  
 
                                                 
71 Case M. 7932 Dow/Dupont dated 27.3.2017.  
72 European Commission - Press release, ‘Mergers: Commission opens in-depth investigation into proposed 
merger between Dow and DuPont’ (11 August 2016) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-







In another case in the highly dynamic agrochemical sector, Bayer/Monsanto74 the 
Commission continued its new approach to the assessment of innovation as a factor of the 
assessment. The Commission assessed more than 2,000 different product markets and 
reviewed 2.7 million internal documents and concluded that the transaction would have 
significantly reduced competition on price and innovation. The Commission focused and 
analysed extensively the innovation incentives of the parties. The Commission found that 
the transaction would have eliminated innovation competition on GM and non-GM traits 
conferring herbicide tolerance or insect resistance. It would also eliminate innovation 
competition in herbicides and herbicide systems (i.e. herbicide combined with a trait 
conferring herbicide tolerance to a crop). The Commission concluded that the divestment 
package the parties offered would enable the purchaser BASF to sustainably replace 
Bayer's competitive effect in these markets and continue to innovate. Thus, innovation 
competition would not be adversely affected as a result of the transaction.  
 
We can surmise from the above analysis that the merger enforcement caselaw is clear. The 
Commission will analyse whether a merger will pose to be a threat to such innovation. 
When formulating a concise formula of how to assess mergers with substantial innovation 
effects in any given market, the Commission's observations in Dow/Dupont is worth 
mentioning.75 In this case the Commission noted the following points in relation to its 
approach on the assessment of innovation: 
 
 
                                                 
74 M.8084 Bayer/Monsanto, unreported 






i. Innovation effects are required to be assessed post-merger when there is a 
competitive landscape with only five integrated R&D players at industry level and 
even fewer players at the level of individual innovation spaces (e.g. insecticides for 
a given crop and pest in the Dow/Dupont case); 
ii. Consideration of high barriers to entry must be analysed due to the need for global 
field stations and registration capabilities;  
iii. Any direct evidence of the suppression of R&D efforts post-merger must be 
factored in; 
iv. The strength and closeness of the merging parties in innovation areas must be 
considered; 
v. Overlaps within the R&D activities of the parties will be considered; as well as 
vi. Past evidence on the relationship between concentration and innovation efforts.76  
 
Thus, the Commission will assess closely a merger between two innovators that are active 
in similar pipeline products, and the transaction may eliminate an important competitive 
force. Remedies in such cases usually aim to introduce new innovative competitor into the 
market to impose competitive constraints to prevent price increase and preserve 
innovation.77 Even if innovation may not be the sole consideration, it is still an influential 
additional concern to competition with implications on the design of the remedies.78  
                                                 
76 Johannes Laitenberger Director-General for Competition, European Commission, “EU competition law in 
innovation and digital markets: fairness and the consumer welfare perspective” MLex / Hogan Lovells event 
Brussels, 10.10.2017, available at  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2017_15_en.pdf. 
77 Raphael De Coninck, “Innovation in EU Merger Control: In Need of a Consistent Framework”, (2016) 2(3) 
Competition Law & Policy Debate 41, 43. 






The above analysis of the caselaw does illustrate that remedies in innovation cases may 
seem too onerous or extensive from a static competition point of view. However, innovation 
goes hand in hand with dynamic competition, thus effective remedies may go beyond the 
traditional approach towards overlapping assets in particular markets. An effective remedy 
can extend to group of assets, such as patents, experts, and other tangible and intangible 
assets. Following the approach of the Commission in the remedies in the Dow/Dupont and 
the Bayer/Monsanto transactions, the Commission can focus on innovation spaces, which 
can extend beyond the standard antitrust or innovation markets. An effective remedy can 
cover not only an actual overlapping process or product (the Research element in R&D), 
but also the thinking behind it and the ability to create an overlapping process or product 
(the Development element in R&D). 
 
The development of the caselaw discussed above, indicates the gradual advancement and 
maturity of the Commission’s analysis of mergers involving innovation considerations. 
Mergers involving important innovators in largely concentrated industries with high 
barriers to entry and with no history of innovation from companies outside the sector, are 
likely to be problematic from a merger control point of view. Such mergers are likely to 
lead to an overall reduction in innovation efforts and, to a reduction in the number and 
quality of new products. In contrast, Colomo79 argues that in the current state of EU 
competition law, there is no way that innovation considerations can be introduced. He adds 
that the standard of proof needed would be too high, and there is a different field of 
intellectual property regime that can better address innovation concerns, if innovation 
concerns may not be easily addressed by administrative action.  
                                                 






After presenting the relevance and importance of innovation in merger assessment, the 
paper discusses the role of innovation as a non-price assessment factor in unilateral conduct 
cases and whether the Commission has taken a different perspective compared to the one 
in merger control. 
 
This paper discusses below two unilateral conduct cases where the Commission focused on 
innovation as one of the considerations it took into account in its assessment. These are the 
Microsoft case and the Google case. As the analysis below will illustrate, the Commission’s 
approach to the assessment of the harm on innovation seems to be elementary compared to 
its merger practice. This may be due to the lack of experience/precedents in unilateral 
conduct cases raising significant concerns on innovation but may also be due to the 
complexity of the relevant sectors and the innovation considerations and complexities that 
these sectors give rise to.  
 
Furthermore, different sectors create different challenges for competition authorities when 
they assess innovation. For example, the pharmaceutical sector that has been the main bread 
and butter type of concentrations where the Commission has assessed innovation raises 
complicated issues as we saw above, but such issues are likely less diverse in nature 
compared to a different sector such as software development, online shopping and similar 
markets. The nature of such sectors is changing at a highly dynamic pace and the challenges 










II.2 Unilateral Conduct in Innovative Markets  
 
In unilateral conduct cases the issue of innovation and other price factors is by nature more 
prevalent where intellectual property issues are at stake. The relationship between 
competition law and intellectual property rights is not only very close, but a very intricate 
one. One of the ultimate - indirect - goals of these two areas of law is the same: favouring 
progress and innovation in any specific industry. The way in which this goal is pursued, 
however, is radically different. While competition law is aimed at promoting the freedom 
of competition in the market and, with some exceptions in specific markets, deregulation, 
the aim of intellectual property law is to protect the IP-right holders and, as a result, limiting 
competition against them whenever they satisfy specific criteria. Thus, there are instances 
of conflict between the two. This mainly happens in situations of cumulative innovation 
and when IP is used strategically in order to exclude competitors and harm consumers.80 
                                                 







There is extensive caselaw exemplifying some of the above concepts. Such cases relate to 
abusive conducts such as81 refusals to supply82 (Commercial Solvents83), tying84 (Hilti85, 
                                                 
81 This list is merely indicative. 
82 On refusal to deal/essential facilities see indicatively: Nagy C. (2007), “Refusal to deal and the doctrine of 
essential facilities in US and EC competition law: a comparative perspective and a proposal for a workable 
analytical framework” E.L. Rev., 32(5), 664-685, Carlton D., (2001), “A General Analysis of Exclusionary 
Conduct and Refusal to Deal – Why Aspen and Kodak Are Misguided,” NBER Working Paper No. 8105, 
www.nber.org/papers/w8105, Chen Z., Ross T. & Stanbury W.T., (1998) “Refusals to Deal and 
Aftermarkets” 13 Review of Industrial Organization 131, Doherty B., (2001) “Just What Are Essential 
Facilities?” 38 CML Rev 397, Jones A., “A Dominant Firm’s Duty to Deal: EC and US Antitrust Law 
Compared” in Handbook of Research in Transatlantic Antitrust (Philip Marsden, ed. 2006), Lang J.T. (1994), 
“Defining Legitimate Competition: Companies’ Duties to Supply Competitors and Access to Essential 
Facilities” 18 Fordham International Law Journal 437, Lao M., (2005) “Aspen Skiing and Trinko: Antitrust 
Intent and Sacrifice” 73 Antitrust Law Journal 171, OECD, “The Essential Facilities Concept” Background 
Note, OCDE/GD(96)113, Robinson G, (2002) “On Refusing to Deal with Rivals” 87 Cornell Law Review 
1177, Stratakis A., (2006), “Comparative Analysis of the US and EU Approach and Enforcement of the 
Essential Facilities Doctrine” 27 ECLR 434, Venit J., (2005) “Article 82: The Last Frontier – Fighting Fire 
with Fire?” 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1157. 
83 Cases 6&7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corp v Commission 
(Commercial Solvents) [1974] ECR 223. 
84 On tying and bundling see indicatively: Spector D. (2006), “From harm to competitors to harm to 
competition: one more effort, please!”, Euro CJ, 2(1) Supp (Special issue), 145-162, Kuhn K-U., Stillman R., 
Caffarra C. (2005) “Economic theories of bundling and their policy implications in abuse cases: an assessment 
in light of the Microsoft case” Euro CJ, 1(1), 85-121, Ridyard D. (2005), “Tying and bundling - cause for 
complaint?” ECLR, 26(6), 316-319, Furse M. (2004), “Article 82, Microsoft and bundling, or "The Half 
Monti"” Comp. L.J., 3(3), 169-178, Jean Tirole, The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer, 1 Comp. Policy Int’l 
1 (2005), Bellamy & Child, European Community Law of Competition, 6th ed., 2008, para 10.119-10.120, 
Bishop/Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law, London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2nd edition, 2002, 






Tetra Pak II86), abuse of intellectual property rights (Magill87) and vexatious litigation 
(Promedia88). Two cases that this paper will discuss are Microsoft and Google as the 
relevant markets are very dynamic, innovative and the two cases have frequently been 
                                                 
Iacobucci, Tying as quality control : A legal and economic analysis, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law, 
Law and Economics. Research Paper No. 01-09, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=293602, W.S. Bowman, 
Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 Yale L.R.19 (19-36) (1957), Hylton/Salinger, Tying Law 
and Policy: A decision-theoretic approach, 69 Antitrust L.J. 469 (486) (2001), Christian Ahlborn/David S. 
Evans/A. Jorge Padilla, The antitrust economics of tying: a farewell to per se illegality, The Antitrust 
Bulletin/Spring-Summer 2004, 287 (323), Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, The Strategic Use of 
Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries, 33 Rand J. Econ. 194 (2002), José 
Carbajo, David de Meza, Daniel J. Seidmann, A strategic motivation for commodity bundling, 38 The Journal 
of Industrial Economics, 283 (1990), Daniel J. Seidmann, Bundling as a facilitating device: A reinterpretation 
of leverage theory, 58 Economica 491 (1991), Yongmin Chen, Equilibrium Product Bundling, 70 J. Bus. 85 
(1997), McAfee, R.P., J. McMillan and M.D. Whinston, Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity bundling and 
correlation of values, 104 Q.J.Econ. 371 (1989), Walter J. Adams & Janet L. Yellen,  Commodity Bundling 
and the Burden of Monopoly,  90 Q.J.Econ. 475 (1976), Richard L. Schmalensee, Gaussian Demand and 
Commodity Bundling, 57 J. Bus. 211 (1984), Michael A. Salinger, A Graphical Analysis of Bundling, 68 J. 
Bus. 85 (1995), KN Hylton & M Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision – Theoritic Approach, 69 
Antitrust L.J., 469 (470-71) (2001), K-U Kühn, R Stillman, C Caffarra, Economic Theories of Bundling and 
Their Policy Implication in Abuse Cases: An Assessment in Light of the Microsoft Case, CEPR Discussion 
Paper No. 4756 (2005), Thomas A. Lampert, Evaluating Bundled Discounts, 89 Minn. L. Rev.  1688,  1700-
1705 (2004-2005), Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Predation, 72 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 27, (2005) . 
85 Case T-30/89, Hilti v Commission [1991], ECR II-1439, confirmed C-53/92P, [1994] ECR I-666. 
86 Case T-83/91, Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission (Tetra Pak II), [1994] ECR II-755. 
87 Magill TV Guide [1989] OJ L78/43. 






juxtaposed against one another in relation to the approach the Commission took especially 
in relation to innovation and non-price assessment factors more generally. 
 
 
II.2.A The Microsoft Case  
 
In the seminal Microsoft interoperability case,89 Microsoft refused to give Sun the 
information and technology necessary to allow its work group server operating systems to 
interoperate with the Windows client PC operating system. Microsoft’s refusal risked 
eliminating competition for work group server operating systems because the refused input 
was indispensable for competitors operating in that market. The Commission argued that if 
competitors had access to the refused information, they would be able to provide new and 
enhanced products to the consumer. These circumstances of an exceptional nature led to 
the conclusion that Microsoft’s refusal constituted an abuse of a dominant position 
incompatible with Article 102, unless it was objectively justified. In another Microsoft case, 
the Commission had launched in 2000 an ex officio investigation into Microsoft's 
incorporation of Windows Media Player into its PC operating system product. The 
Commission concluded that consumers had no choice but to obtain Windows with 
Windows Media Player and as a remedy Microsoft needed to provide a version of Windows 
which does not include Windows Media Player.90 The Commission noted91 that consumers 
                                                 
89 Microsoft [2007] OJ L 32/23, Microsoft Corp. v Commission, T-201/04 R, [2004] ECR II-4463, Microsoft 
Corp. v Commission T-201/04, 17/09/2007 
90 Banasevic N., Huby J., Pena Castellot M., Sitar O., and Piffaut H., Commission adopts Decision in the 
Microsoft case, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 2, 2004. 






are harmed because Microsoft’s conduct undermines ‘the structure of competition in media 
players which is liable to result in deterrence of innovation and eventual reduction in choice 
of competing media players’.92  
 
Bellis notes that the Commission’s attempts to defend its theories should be of serious 
concern to any company innovating in high- technology products who wish to improve 
existing features or add new features to successive versions of its products on a uniform 
basis.93 Banasevic et al, argued that customers will prefer using Windows Media Player, 
since a wider array of complementary software and content will be available compared to 
other competing products due to the fact that the underlying software where the Media 
Player will operate is also part of the same ecosystem.94 They add that this fact seriously 
undermines the competitive process in the media player market to the detriment of 
innovation and the consumer, and has spill-over effects on competition in other markets.95 
 
                                                 
92 In relation to this tying abuse, the General Court added a new requirement to the tying abuse criteria with 
its Microsoft decision, arguing that the dominant undertaking is engaged in abusive tying when it does not 
give to consumers a choice to obtain the tying product without the tied product. 
93 Jean-François Bellis has represented Microsoft throughout the Commission’s administrative proceedings 
leading to the Microsoft Decision and in the Commission’s appeal against that Decision, and made the oral 
pleading on behalf of Microsoft with regard to the tying part of the case. Bellis J.F., The Commission’s 
Microsoft Tying Case: Implications for Innovation Throughout the High-Technology Sector, 
http://www.lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/files/Bellis.pdf  
94 Banasevic N., Huby J., Pena Castellot M., Sitar O., and Piffaut H., Commission adopts Decision in the 
Microsoft case, Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 2, 2004. 
95 Banasevic N., Huby J., Pena Castellot M., Sitar O., and Piffaut H., Commission adopts Decision in the 






 II.2.B The Google Shopping case in the EU 
 
The Google shopping case is one of the controversial cases, or possibly the most 
controversial one, in unilateral conduct enforcement to date. The fine is the highest ever 
after the one on the Google Android case for an abusive conduct. The relevant market is a 
highly innovative one where price factors play limited or no role, but non-price factors such 
as choice and innovation assume a significant role in the Commission’s assessment of the 
abusive conduct.  
 
In the Google case,96 the Commission noted that Google’s conduct can lead to less 
innovation. However, it assesses this impact in only three paragraphs out of 755 and 
mentions the word innovation and its derivative words a total of seven times. Thus, the 
Commission’s analysis on innovation seems to be rather short especially considering the 
importance the Commission and Commissioner Vestager has put on innovation.97  
 
The Commission identified a number of practices that could constitute an infringement by 
Google of Art. 102 TFEU.98 Its chief concern lay in the potential effects the prominent 
display within Google’s web search results, of Google’s own specialised web search 
                                                 
96 Case AT.39740 Google Search (Shopping). The research on the Google case has been kindly supported by 
Google Inc.  
97 Interestingly, the word innovation and its derivatives are mentioned 6 times in the press release related to 
the decision.    
98 Commission seeks feedback on commitments offered by Google Search (Shopping) to address competition 







services as compared to competing specialised web search services could have.99 The 
Commission expressed its concerns as to whether this practice could result in online traffic 
being diverted away from Google's competitors in specialised search towards Google's own 
specialised search services. This could ultimately harm consumers, as according to the 
Commission’s reasoning, on the one hand the latter are not aware of the promotion of 
Google's services within the search results; and on the other hand, competitors' results that 
are potentially as relevant are significantly less visible and even sometimes not directly 
visible to users, and hence more difficult for the user to find, ‘for instance because the user 
has to scroll down the screen to see them or has to go to a subsequent search results web 
page.’100  
 
Consumer harm would lie according to the Commission in the reduction of the ability of 
consumers to find a potentially more relevant choice of specialised search services.101 
Furthermore, the Commission found that Google's conduct has a negative impact on 
consumers and innovation, in the sense that ‘users do not necessarily see the most relevant 
                                                 
99 The Commission thus focused on services allowing users to search for specific categories of information 
such as restaurants, hotels or products. See European Commission, MEMO 25 April 2013, available at < 
http//europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-383_en.htm >. 
100 See European Commission, ibid.  
101 The Commission identified as further potentially abusive practices the use by Google without consent of 
original content from third party web sites in its own specialised web search services; the fact that Google 
engaged in agreements that obliged third party web sites to obtain all or most of their online search 
advertisements from Google; as well as the imposition by Google of contractual restrictions on the 
transferability of online search advertising campaigns to rival search advertising platforms and the 
management of such campaigns across Google's Adwords and rival search advertising platforms. See 






comparison shopping results in response to their queries, and that incentives to innovate 
from rivals are lowered as they know that however good their product, they will not benefit 
from the same prominence as Google's product.’102 The Commission further argued that 
the conduct which was foreclosing competing comparison shopping services, may lead to 
higher fees for merchants, higher prices for consumers, and less innovation. 
 
Thus, the Commission noted that Google’s conduct could cause consumer harm by means 
of the reduction of choice for consumers as well as by stifling innovation in the fields of 
specialised search services and online search advertising. They accordingly asked for – and 
this is largely reflected in the Commission’s statement - Google to ‘treat its own 
comparison shopping service and those of rivals in the same way’.103  
 
Juxtaposing the Microsoft and Google case, in the former, there was a clear reduction of 
quality - detrimental to consumers – upon which the Courts relied to hold that there was a 
negative impact on consumer welfare and thus (in conjunction with foreclosure of 
competitors) led to a finding of abusive tying. Furthermore, the impact of Microsoft’s 
conduct on competitors would also include the harm on their innovation drive. This 
requirement is certainly not fulfilled in the Google case which we will discuss below as 
consumers act freely in the market and are not obliged or penalized in any way when 
choosing the vertical search engine of their preference. In the Google case, there is no 
argument in relation to deterioration of the quality of services provided by Google but on 
the contrary the inclusion of the new format has provided better services for customers in 
                                                 
102 See European Commission, MEMO 15 April 2015, ibid. 
103 “Antitrust: Commission sends Statement of Objections to Google on comparison shopping service”; See 






the primary market. A similar argument of product improvement was made in the UK 
Streetmap case,104 in a similar factual context to the Commission’s Google shopping case. 
 
 
II.2.C How to balance unilateral conduct enforcement with the dominant 
undertaking’s innovation drive? 
 
In assessing a dominant firm’s conduct it is important to explore not only the existence of 
a link between the conduct of the dominant company and the anticompetitive effects but 
also the characteristics that such a link should bear for the dominant undertaking’s 
behaviour to be considered as abusive. When a behaviour is established as procompetitive 
in the primary market, meaning that it benefits the consumers and leads to a more efficient 
competitive process then the assessment of any anticompetitive effects of this very 
behaviour to a relevant market need to be balanced. In case a link is not proved to the 
adequate degree, it is highly possible that a dominant company heavily investing in 
innovation and providing quality services in the primary market is condemned for the 
results of its success on the competitors of a secondary market. Such an approach comes 
also in conflict with the Commission’s own approach, which acknowledges the right of all 
companies to compete fiercely on the market if this competition is ultimately beneficial for 
consumers.105 In the Commission’s own words in its Guidelines a dominant undertaking is 
allowed to compete on the merits and ‘in doing so (the Commission) is mindful that that 
                                                 
104 The presentation of the thumbnail map introduced by Google was seen as a technical efficiency that leads 
to superior results for the user on the SERP and counter-balanced the exclusionary effect. 
105 Peeperkorn and Viertio, Implementing an effects-based approach to Article 82, Competition Policy 






what really matters is protecting an effective competitive process and not simply protecting 
competitors. This may well mean that competitors who deliver less to consumers in terms 
of price, choice, quality and innovation will leave the market.’106  
 
Companies like Google, Yahoo, Microsoft and others that create search engines must have 
the freedom to make strategic choices about the design of their services. Such freedom is 
inconsistent with an expansive principle of search neutrality,107 but it is indispensable for 
innovation in the search engine market.108 Search neutrality is like perfect competition in 
economic theory. It doesn't exist in practice! ‘Search neutrality’ would likely impede the 
natural evolution of search engines and constrain innovation.109 The most important 
consequence of search neutrality is that by making search engine results uniform, 
competitors would no longer have an incentive to innovate by investing in enhancing 
consumers’ value.110 Manne and Wright argue that ‘search neutrality’, in its attempt to 
achieve greater uniformity across search engines, reduces the incentive to engage in that 
                                                 
106 Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings para. 6.  
107 Crane D., Search neutrality and referral dominance, Jnl of Competition Law & Economics (2012) 8 (3) 
459-468 
108 Crane D., Search neutrality and referral dominance, Jnl of Competition Law & Economics (2012) 8 (3) 
459-468. 
109 Lao M., Search, Essential Facilities, and the Antitrust Duty to Deal Northwestern Journal of Technology 
and Intellectual Property, vol 11, issue 5. 







form of competition.’111 Product design choices that can be proved to aim at reducing 
competition and quality justify competition authority intervention. 
 
According to Bork and Sidak, Google’s practices in search constitute a product 
improvement, which ‘adds value to Google search from the perspective of both consumers 
and advertisers [whereas] Google’s critics have attempted to cast this innovation as a form 
of foreclosure’.112 This product improvement element is not prevalent in the Microsoft case 
but is one of the main arguments Mr Justice Roth considered in the Streetmap case.113 The 
                                                 
111 Manne G., Wright J., If Search Neutrality is the Answer, What’s the Question, 
http//ssrn.com/abstract=1807951, 46. 
112 Bork R., Sidak G., What does the Chicago school teach about internet search and the antitrust treatment 
of Google? Jnl of Competition Law & Economics (2012) 8 (4) 663-700. They argue, that ‘search engines 
epitomize dynamic competition the virtuous cycle in which innovation drives competition, which further 
drives consumer-welfare-enhancing innovation.’ They add that antitrust intervention that mitigates Google’s 
innovation drive would harm consumers as a result of lower quality products and services. 
113 Streetmap EU Ltd v Google Inc. & Ors [2016] EWHC 253 (Ch) (12 February 2016). This case before the 
UK High Court bears similarities to the European Commission case and provides a useful exposition of 
competition assessment that pertains to the Commission case. The facts in Streetmap consider the introduction 
by Google of a thumbnail map in place of the previous clickable shortcut link in geographical search queries, 
aiming to enhance the online user’s experience while in the comparison shopping case they have to do with 
the presentation of the Shopping Unit on Google’s general search page with directly monetised listings from 
third-party sites which direct the user to the merchant’s website compared to the previous version of one 
general link to the shopping website. The presentation of the thumbnail map introduced by Google was seen 







FTC noted in relation with its investigation114 that ‘while Google’s prominent display of its 
own vertical search results on its search results page had the effect in some cases of pushing 
other results ‘below the fold,’ the evidence suggests that Google’s primary goal in 
introducing this content was to quickly answer, and better satisfy, its users’ search queries 
by providing directly relevant information.’115 It should be emphasize, that by protecting 
less efficient competitors, there is an unavoidable risk of protecting competitors rather than 
competition itself.116  
 
The element of product or process innovation leading to respective improvements needs to 
be considered by competition authorities in the assessment of abusive unilateral conducts. 
That will allow the authorities to take a proportionate approach towards enforcement, one 
that will ensure a careful balance and proportionality between a penalty that will deter 
anticompetitive conducts and one that will adversely affect innovation incentives. It should 
be noted, that the penalty is not constrained to monetary figures but also and quite likely 
                                                 
114 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices In the Matter of Google 
Inc. FTC File Number 111-0163 January 3, 2013, 
https//www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commission-regarding-
googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf, 2. 
115 Thus, there was a quality in the improvement of the service. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission 
Regarding Google’s Search Practices In the Matter of Google Inc. FTC File Number 111-0163 January 3, 
2013, https//www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/statement-commission-regarding-
googles-search-practices/130103brillgooglesearchstmt.pdf, 2. “[The] FTC concluded that the introduction of 
Universal Search as well as additional changes made to Google’s search algorithms—even those that may 
have had the effect of harming individual competitors—could be plausibly justified as innovations that 
improved Google’s product and the experience of its users.” http//www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm 






more importantly to the changes in the business models that remedies in unilateral conduct 
cases frequently entail. What the table above does not show is the impact of the remedy on 
the profitability of the company and more importantly on the business model that has given 
rise to the innovative products/services. The estimates vary depending on the company, the 
maturity of the sector, the demand trends but we can certainly argue that direct or indirect 
intervention by competition enforcement in the modus operandi of companies in an 
innovative and dynamic sector needs to be done not only with caution but also with care, 
in order to strike the appropriate balance between welcomed and necessary enforcement 
against anticompetitive conducts and the potential knock on impact on the operation of the 
company and its innovation incentives. 
 
The previous Commissioner for Competition Neelie Kroes has stated, regarding the focus 
of competition enforcement, that ‘whether we are looking at the actions of dominant 
companies, breaking up cartels, vetting mergers, or approving State aid--the potential harm 
to consumers is at the heart of what we do. We are applying this ‘consumer welfare 
standard’ through better use of economic analysis in our work.’117 It is clear that consumer 
welfare is placed at the heart of competition enforcement. It is essential to protect 
consumers from negative effects resulting from insufficiently competitive market structures 
and anti-competitive business behavior. Foreclosure or harm to competitors is relevant only 
if this implies harm to consumers through the loss of at least equally efficient or innovative 
competitors.118  
                                                 
117 Speech of the Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes of November 16, 2006 at the Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute, accessible at http//europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/691  
118 Kellerbauer M., The Commission's new enforcement priorities in applying article 82 EC to dominant 






In the context of a unilateral conduct case, what the Commission should assess in detail is 
whether the harm on some equally efficient or innovative competitors is counter-balanced 
by the benefits consumers have received from the conduct of the dominant company. A 
similar approach of assessing the beneficial impact of a conduct to consumers was followed 
by Mr Justice Roth in the Streetmap case. A product improvement is expected to affect 
competitors, which are not able to provide an equally efficient service or a good alternative. 
Therefore, before condemning a conduct as exclusionary a detailed assessment of the 
procompetitive effects of the conduct should be made in unilateral conduct cases.  
 
EU and US competition authorities both consider dynamic efficiency as a key means of 
maximizing consumer welfare and achieving their policy objectives.119 We should be very 
cautious in attempting to curtail innovation in industries that through innovation enhance 
consumer welfare.  
 
                                                 
119 See speech by G.F. Masoudi, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, DOJ Antitrust Division, Efficiency in 
analysis of antitrust, standard setting, and intellectual property 18 January 2007, Brussels, Belgium where he 
stated "Static efficiency is a powerful force for increasing consumer welfare, but an even greater driver of 
consumer welfare is dynamic efficiency, which results from entirely new ways of doing business. Economists 
now recognize that the gains from dynamic efficiency, also called “leapfrog” competition, can far outstrip the 
gains from incremental static improvements. It follows that policymakers should pay particular attention to 
the impact of laws and enforcement decisions on dynamic efficiency. Intellectual property laws are aimed 
directly at encouraging dynamic efficiency." The European Commission’s commitment to encouraging 
innovation through competition law enforcement is also illustrated by the speech by Lowe, Director General 
of DG Competition, European Commission ‘Innovation and the Regulation of Dominant Firms’, 23 
September 2008, Georgetown University, Washington D.C.  In Galloway J., Driving Innovation a case for 






In such markets incumbents do not compete for the market but compete for and on 
innovation. They compete for the next status quo changing invention, the next ‘CD’, the 
next ‘search engine’, the next ‘platform market’. The incumbents are in a continuous, self-
reinforcing innovation and creativity drive. In dynamic and innovative industries, certain 
competitors may be harmed but that fact does not change that consumers benefit from this 
innovation drive and its spillovers and would be disproportionate to chastise the innovative 
firm’s efforts for harm that competitors may have had, unless a careful assessment is made 
of the nature of the harmed competitors as well as of the resulting benefits of innovation on 
consumers. 
 
III. Is there any impact of competition enforcement on innovation drive  
Competition authorities should be cautious in order to distinguish between harmful, anti-
competitive exclusion from ‘innovation exclusion’ that can also be as a result of undistorted 
competition on the merits that is driven and expressed through continuous R&D. 
Competition authorities must aim to clarify whether a dominant firm’s practice, which may 
at times be considered by the competitors to exercise a detrimental effect on them, is the 
result of a quality improvement which would be beneficial for consumers and consumer 
welfare, or rather a deliberate attempt by the dominant firm to harm and exclude its 
rivals.120 In addition, a balancing act between the ensuing penalties and the impact on 
                                                 
120 Cf. Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding Google’s Search Practices, ibid., p2 et seq.; 
see also Marina Lao, Search, Essential Facilities and the Antitrust Duty to Deal, Northwestern Journal of 
Technology and Intellectual Property, Vol. 11 (2013), No. 5, 276; Ammori, Marvin and Pelican, Luke, 
Proposed Remedies for Search Bias 'Search Neutrality' and Other Proposals in the Google Inquiry (May 14, 






innovation is also appropriate and necessary to prevent mid to long term adverse 
consequences in the dynamic development of markets.  
 
Imposing a burden on a dominant company in relation to its innovation drive risks stifling 
innovation and harming consumers. In Microsoft, the Commission’s officials do emphasize 
that the Commission did not merely reject Microsoft's justifications for the conduct, and 
assessed the impact of the remedy of the obligation to supply on Microsoft's incentives to 
innovate.121 Thus, the remedy in the Commission’s view did not risk the innovation 
incentives of Microsoft.122 Although it is not straightforward to test the above assertion of 
the Commission, we present below in tabular and graphical format the investment of 
Microsoft on R&D between 2002 and 2018. Interestingly the R&D investment was 
                                                 
121 First, the Commission concluded that an order to supply the relevant information could not lead to the 
cloning of Microsoft's product, not least because the interoperability information relates to interface 
specifications as opposed to source code. Second, the Commission took account of the fact that disclosure of 
interoperability information was commonplace in the industry. Third, the Commission drew inspiration from 
the IBM undertaking and from the 1991 Software Directive, which strikes a balance between interoperability 
and copyright in restricting in specific circumstances the exercise of copyright over software (including 
exercise by non-dominant undertakings) in favour of interoperability, thereby stressing the importance of 
interoperability in the software industry in order to enhance competition and innovation. Banasevic N., Huby 
J., Pena Castellot M., Sitar O., and Piffaut H., Commission adopts Decision in the Microsoft case, 
Competition Policy Newsletter, Number 2, 2004. 
122 Microsoft’s innovation drive in the web browser market had slowed down once the Internet Explorer 
became dominant.…because Internet Explorer was so dominant, Microsoft had little incentive to update and 
improve it. So, in the end, other – more innovative – browsers like Opera, Safari, Firefox and eventually 
Google Chrome appeared. In comparison with these newcomers, IE looked increasingly tired and 
impoverished, the software equivalent of a former heavyweight champion grown fat and arthritic.” Netscape: 






increasing between 2002 and 2004 and in 2005 it fell to levels lower than 2002 and it took 
































We are not advocating that the decrease in the R&D investment was solely due to the 
adverse impact on innovation incentives as a result of the decision but the timing of the 
change in the increasing trend on R&D investment prior to the Commission’s decision is 
worth noting. 
 
As the table below illustrates, companies in dynamic sectors invest significant amounts in 
R&D. The table124 focuses on some of the infamous European Commission unilateral 
conduct decisions and shows the fines that have been imposed on some major innovative 
companies that have been found by the European Commission to breach unilateral conduct 
rules. What is noteworthy is the amount of the fine not as a proportion of the dominant 
firm’s revenues but as a proportion of the investment of the dominant company on R&D. 
 
                                                 
124 Some data come from Schrepel T., The European Commission Is Undermining R&D and Innovation: 
Here’s How to Change It  ICLE Antitrust & Consumer Protection Research Program Issue Brief 2018-2. The 






Company Revenues  Investment 
in R&D 
















































































Tomra is by far the prominent example where the fine was almost twice the amount spent 
on R&D. In the Google cases, the combined fine for both Shopping and Android cases was 
46% of the R&D investment. In the Google Android case, the fine itself is irrelevant as it 
amounts to 43 days of operating cash flow (Q4 2017) and 4% of the cash balance that is on 
hand.126 However, when comparing the fine with the investment on R&D127 the picture is 
somewhat bleaker as the fine in the Android case amounts to 30% of the investment on 
R&D. Google’s fines as a proportion of R&D, were followed by Qualcomm with 21.4%, 
Intel with 17.8% and Microsoft with the fine being equal to 7.8% of the investment on 
R&D.  
 
The graph below illustrates the fines in the above cases as a percentage of the revenues of 
the dominant companies. The maximum fine can be up to 10% of the annual worldwide 
turnover of the dominant undertaking. The two cases against Google have a cumulative 
fine that is equal to 2.4% (for Google shopping) and 4.5% (for the Android case) of 











Google’s annual worldwide turnover. Tomra leads the table with the fine being equal to 




The following graph shows the fines as a percentage of the R&D investment of the 
dominant companies. Tomra and Google lead the table. 
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The following two graphs show the fines and the investment on R&D in a comparative way 
between the cases. Google tops the ranking having at least double the amount of fines 
compared to all the other cases in the analysis, and almost equal amount of investment on 
R&D. 
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Observing the above graphs makes it obvious that fines may have a significant impact on 
the R&D efforts of companies. This can be one of the many reasons why a competition 
authority must avoid Type I errors128 in unilateral conduct enforcement. However, as long 
as the fines are imposed for anticompetitive practices arising from R&D efforts fines that 





In dynamic and rapidly-changing industries involving a high level and pace of innovation, 
where technologies and products are generally short-lived, there is a need to follow a more 
flexible and holistic competition assessment, considering multiple variables such as R&D 
investment, the benefit of consumers, the quality and variety of offered products etc.129 
Whilst in other industries, competition takes place primarily through standard price 
competition and, possibly, also via incremental innovations, in innovative and dynamic 
industries the primary and distinguishing feature lies in the fact that incumbents engage in 
dynamic competition for rather than in the market.130  
                                                 
128 Type I error denotes overenforcement.  
129 Josef Bejcek, ‘Mergers and new technologies’ (2005) 36(7) IIC 809, 821 
130 Geradin, Damien and Ahlborn, Christian and Denicolò, Vincenzo and Padilla, Jorge, DG Comp's 
Discussion Paper on Article 82 Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust Rules for Dynamically 
Competitive Industries (March 2006), 15 et seq. See also on disruptive innovation Graef, Inge; 
Wahyuningtyas, Sih Yuliana; Valcke, Peggy (2014) How Google and others upset competition analysis 
disruptive innovation and European competition law, 25th European Regional Conference of the International 







Drawing on Schumpeterian thought and the notion of market evolution and competition 
relating to a process of so-called ‘creative destruction’ that threatens the very basis of 
survival and existence of market participants irrespective of their respective profit 
margins,131 we can argue that drastic innovation makes market leadership highly 
contestable.132 The Commission has admitted that it aims at protecting innovation growth 
while keeping markets contestable and allowing for profitable returns on investments.133 
 
An important implication for antitrust intervention design as well as for the appropriateness 
of the conventional toolkit for competitive assessment of industries and markets 
characterised by intense innovation is that we should refrain from adopting a per se 
approach (in unilateral conduct cases)134 or tough sanctions (e.g. large fines/extensive 
remedies in unilateral conduct cases/concentrations) in dynamic innovative markets, as 
there are clear reasons to approach innovative and novel practices with caution.135 This 
relates to both unilateral conduct enforcement (as regards liability, remedy and fine) as well 
                                                 
131 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper Collins Publishers 1984 ed., 1942, 
page 84. 
132 Geradin, Damien and Ahlborn, Christian and Denicolò, Vincenzo and Padilla, Jorge, DG Comp's 
Discussion Paper on Article 82 Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust Rules for Dynamically 
Competitive Industries (March 2006), 15, available at SSRN <http//ssrn.com/abstract=894466>. 
133 Johannes Laitenberger, Competition And Innovation, CRA Annual Brussels Conference (1st edn, 2015) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2015_04_en.pdf>  
134 Crane eloquently emphasizes, ‘antitrust law should never seek to destroy dominance by prohibiting 
dominant firms from innovating to keep up with their customers’ changing demands.’ Crane D., Search 
neutrality and referral dominance, Jnl of Competition Law & Economics (2012) 8 (3) 459-468 







as the nature of theories of harm and nature, structure as well as extent of remedies in 
merger enforcement.  
 
In dynamic markets and in the absence of sector regulation
 
the potential risk of over-
enforcement (Type I errors) should be preferable to under-enforcement (Type II errors), 136 
but competition authorities should also bear in mind that there are greater social costs with 
Type I errors than Type II errors, 137 as the market should self-correct Type II errors more 
readily than Type I errors.138 Thus, a rule of reason approach in cases that relate to 
dynamically innovative industries, can ensure competitors’ access to necessary assets 
without impeding a firm's innovation drive for product development and distribution.139 
 
Turning in particular to the design of remedies, as the development of competition 
enforcement usually lags behind the pace of innovation, the technological development as 
well as the structural changes in dynamic markets, there is the risk that competition 
authorities may intervene and seek remedies but by the time the remedies is in place, the 
market will have changed significantly rendering the remedy ineffective.  
 
                                                 
136 Galloway J., Driving Innovation a case for targeted competition policy in dynamic markets, 
http//ssrn.com/abstract=1763676  
137 Easterbrook F., The Limits of Antitrust, (1984) 63 Texas L. Rev. 1, and Manne G. and Wright J., 
Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, (2010) 6(1) J. Competition L. & Econ. 153.   
138 Galloway J., Driving Innovation a case for targeted competition policy in dynamic markets, 
http//ssrn.com/abstract=1763676  
139 Gifford D., Kurdle R., Antitrust approaches to dynamically competitive industries in the united states and 






The Microsoft remedy in relation to the Media Player is one example and a similar 
argument was being put forward by Commissioner Almunia140 when he was deliberating 
the possibility of commitments in the Google case. The impact of the remedies in the 
Google case remains to be seen, but initial views of the Commission seem to indicate that 
the remedies have the desired effect,141 albeit competitors still fiercely argue that the impact 
is not significant and the Commission needs to intervene.142 Interestingly in the Google 
Android case,143 as one of the remedies, Google announced a licence fee on mobile 
manufacturers.144 One can envisage the scenario whereby large manufacturers will be in a 
                                                 
140 The industry we are looking at is also particularly fast moving, because online search itself is constantly 
evolving. Since we started the investigation, the way search results are presented and the kind of services 
provided have changed many times...My responsibility when enforcing the antitrust rules in this case is to 
make sure that Internet users are provided with choice, so they can decide between services based on their 
merits, and to preserve incentives to innovate across the board, so that users can benefit from new or better 
services tomorrow…Antitrust is not an adequate instrument to impose on Google a specific algorithm or to 
prevent Google from improving its services if it wishes to do so. Nor, as a competition authority, can the 
Commission act in this case as a regulator for all the issues arising in the online world or raised by 




142 Open letter to EU Commissioner Vestager about Google remedies 
http://www.preiskel.com/tag/google-shopping/, Google antitrust remedy delivers few changes for rivals 
 https://www.ft.com/content/b3779ef6-b974-11e7-8c12-5661783e5589 
143 This paper does not focus on this case as the decision is not published yet. 
144 The details/licence levels are still unclear at the time of writing. Reports mention that Google will charge 
hardware firms up to $40 per device to use its apps under a new licensing system to replace one that the 
European Union this year deemed anti-competitive, Reuters, Google to charge Android partners up to $40 






position to pay the fee and at the same time maintain their innovation focus, however, 
smaller ones may struggle. In addition the price of the product for consumers may rise if 
manufacturers pass on the cost of the licence fee. Thus, not only innovation in this market 
may not improve as smaller manufacturers may face difficulties, but the price of the mobile 
phones based on the Android software to consumers may rise as well, an outcome that the 
Commission should have taken or may indeed have taken into consideration as a possibility 
in the assessment of the harm arising from Google’s conduct. 
 
The remedies in the concentrations in the pharmaceutical sector that this paper presented, 
appear to be narrow focusing on the overlaps in commercialised products or R&D pipelines 
that the Commission identified in its analysis. This follows its standard analysis in 
horizontal mergers. The two exceptions appear to be the two concentrations in the 
agrochemical sector, Dow/Dupont145 and Bayer/Monsanto146 where, as discussed above, 
the remedies focus on addressing competition harm in antitrust spaces rather than antitrust 
markets and the former in both cases was wider than the latter. These two transactions 





                                                 
 https://www.silicon.co.uk/mobility/mobile-apps/google-licence-fee-european-238019  
https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/google-charging-android-device-makers-licensing-fee-for-google-
services-europe/  
145 Case M. 7932 Dow/Dupont dated 27.3.2017 






Competition authorities should minimise the outcome of over-deterring welfare-enhancing 
innovations.147 Such innovation drive is what makes markets competitive, as in dynamic 
markets innovation drives competition.148 Competition enforcement should be cautious in 
mitigating innovation efforts through competition enforcement unless of course consumer 
harm can be documented. The innovation aspect can be deemed critical and decisive with 
regard to the outcome of competition enforcement cases related to unilateral conduct as 
well as concentrations. 
                                                 
147 Manne G., Rinehart W., The Market Realities that Undermined the FTC’s Antitrust Case Against Google, 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology Occasional Paper Series, July 2013, 12 
148 As Waller and Sag argue the insights of Shumpeter in relation to innovation being the key to growth and 
that creative destruction is a vital source of innovation are well accepted. Shumpeter has noted that the process 
of creative destruction relates to a powerful incumbent firm, which is being overwhelmed by new forms of 
innovation that radically changed the nature of competition. In Weber Waller S., & Sag M., Promoting 
Innovation, Iowa Law Review, Vol. 100 2223 - 2247, 2226. JA Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and 
Democracy (5th edn, George Allen & Unwin 1976). 
